ABSTRACT
There is currently limited information on best practices for the development of governance requirements for distributed research networks (DRNs), an emerging model that promotes clinical data reuse and improves timeliness of comparative effectiveness research. Much of the existing information is based on a single type of stakeholder such as researchers or administrators. This paper reports on a triangulated approach to developing DRN data governance requirements based on a combination of policy analysis with experts, interviews with institutional leaders, and patient focus groups. This approach is illustrated with an example from the Scalable National Network for Effectiveness Research, which resulted in 91 requirements. These requirements were analyzed against the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) protected versus non-protected health information. The requirements addressed all FIPPs, showing how a DRN's technical infrastructure is able to fulfill HIPAA regulations, protect privacy, and provide a trustworthy platform for research.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
With increased availability of large health datasets, networks allowing rapid advancements in knowledge 1 for comparative effectiveness research (CER), patient-centered outcomes research, and quality improvement research have emerged. A distributed research network (DRN) is one such network that allows researchers to use data from multiple institutions through controlled network functions rather than by direct integration of systems or export of datasets, thereby allowing local organizations to retain control of their own data, 2 reduce legal and privacy concerns, and better retain control over data. 3 Several research networks have described general governance mechanisms 4 -for example, the HMO Research Network, MiniSentinel, and eMERGE. Others have designed system requirements, functions, features, or capabilities that are necessary for operation based on the input of one stakeholder group such as health system leaders. 5 Some authors have suggested that governance should include data privacy and security, audit requirements, conflicts of interest, financial strategies and sustainability plans, clear stewardship, standardization in protocols, and agreements. 2 3 6 7 There is limited federal and state regulatory and legal guidance for DRNs, except for HIPAA deidentification standards for secondary use of data. 8 Patient control is also gaining recognition in the design of networks. Surveys have shown that patients think that electronic health records protect privacy and security better than paper records, 9 but health information exchange worsens privacy and security. 10 Patients also desire granular control over data sharing, and prototype systems for managing that control are being developed. 11 12 DRNs tend to be complex collaborations that engender interactions among multiple stakeholders, including federal and state governments, research centers and universities, commercial entities, healthcare organizations, and patient groups. Data governance requirements must relate to and satisfy these various groups politically and ethically while upholding strict technical standards for successful operation. While several networks have suggested their own practices, 13 14 there is little objective rationale for governance decisions.
OBJECTIVE
This article aims to address the lack of objective evidence for governance by contributing an example of the multi-stakeholder informed development of data governance requirements in the Scalable National Network for Effectiveness Research (SCANNER) which may be illustrative for DRN developers and participants. SCANNER is intended as a scalable and flexible DRN for managing interoperable research resources subject to governance rules. In this architecture, data remain at the originating sites, and only results of analytical processes are transmitted to a core network node. Given different access policies at participating institutions, policy enforcement is accomplished through a combination of local and network strategies, including encoding of policies in software whenever possible (figure 1).
METHODS AND MATERIALS
This project utilizes a triangulation method for developing data governance requirements by combining data from three related SCANNER projects: (1) policy analysis with experts; (2) focus groups with patients; (3) interviews with institutional leaders. This mixed method has the potential to improve internal validity in qualitative analysis, 15 16 increase completeness of data, 17 and evaluate health information technology. 18 The first study involved policy analysis with experts and included comparison of privacy and security laws and state health information exchange guidelines and application of a Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs)-based framework 19 to CER use cases involving four data types: summary data consisting of counts, rates or statistical results only; deidentified data; limited dataset (LDS); and identified data. Results are reported elsewhere. 20 In the second study, patient focus groups at three SCANNER medical centers were conducted to understand views on ethical issues in electronic data sharing. Patients expressed concerns related to altruism and personal benefit from data sharing, security, justice and the social responsibility of organizations conducting research, trust, and consent and authorization. The questions that were posed and the results have been published. 21 Third, 15 interviews were conducted at three SCANNER institutions including two academic medical centers and one Veteran's Administration hospital. The respondents were senior staff in the institutional review board (IRB), privacy, compliance, information technology (IT) security, research informatics, and clinical research. A semistructured interview guide was developed and pretested with three members of the expert panel: a chief medical privacy and compliance officer, a research institute IRB specialist, and a health information exchange leader. The final interview guide (see online supplementary appendix) included a walkthrough of paper screenshots of the anticipated SCANNER design, and interviewees were asked for requirements that would need to be fulfilled for the organization's participation. All interviews were 1-3 h and held onsite in private offices, audio-taped, and transcribed. Individual names were removed from transcripts, but roles and institution names were retained.
Data governance requirements were generated iteratively. An initial set of legal and regulatory requirements was developed with the expert panel. Then another draft was developed from analysis of patient focus group and institutional interview transcripts. Two members of the research team independently coded potential requirements from a subset of transcripts. The initial codes were discussed in order to standardize them, and all transcripts were coded. Requirements were compiled and crosslisted by institution and role. Requirements that were identified by at least two respondents were automatically included, and all others were discussed by three researchers. Elements that were thought not necessary or 'nice to have' by respondents and those requirements identified by only one respondent were categorized as 'optional.'
RESULTS
Results of the investigation were predicated on the newly enacted policy that any entity that handles protected health information (PHI) is a business associate and is subject to some of the privacy, and all the security, rules of HIPAA. 22 With this in mind, the diverse set of 91 requirements generated from the analysis of stakeholder data was organized into two categories: (1) basic requirements for all data types; (2) data type requirements distinguishing between those for PHI and non-PHI. Table 1 details basic network requirements, which start with display of information for transparency, including a description of the network structure and governance, as well as a listing of participating institutions and studies being conducted. Additional requirements provide the ability to manage workflows based on key data elements in the network agreement, IRB protocols, and certificates of confidentiality where applicable. Access management is a multilayered process including approval of users by the participating institution supplemented by one-factor or two-factor authentication of identity, and enforcement of credentials for specific datasets according to IRB protocols. Finally, safeguards such as restrictions on devices, use of encryption, and strict segregation of datasets are required. Table 2 summarizes selected DRN requirements by FIPPs and data type: summary, deidentified, LDS, and identified. The requirements illustrate the differences in functional requirements based on the data types. Under HIPAA, summary and deidentified data are not considered PHI, while LDS and identified data are. There are no requirements regarding summary data beyond basic sets. The requirements are cumulative going from left to right in the table -for example, requirements for identified data subsume LDS, deidentified data requirements, and general network.
There are basic requirements that apply to the first two FIPPS, (A) 'individual access' and (B) 'correction'. Patient-level research data are usually not centrally stored in DRNs such as SCANNER, hence contact with individuals and maintenance of changes for PHI are not relevant for SCANNER. (C) 'Openness and transparency' are handled by public disclosure regarding the network and its participants and study topics via the network website. (D) 'Individual choice' principle, consent and authorization are generally handled at the institution at the time of data collection and are not under the network's responsibility. However, the network requirement is to assure that institutions attest that notification, consent or authorization was appropriately obtained. In (E) 'collection, use and disclosure limitation', the IRB attributes are used to screen for the level of identification, and assure that use is approved for the study and the user. In the case of SCANNER, there is currently no downloading or saving of identified data allowed. Requirements to segregate datasets from each other and prohibit the combination with other data help assure the data are not contaminated, satisfying the (F) 'integrity' requirement. (G) 'Accountability' is managed through a network agreement, a user agreement, and audit capabilities. Enhanced accountability for PHI (whether stored or only transmitted) is codified in an HIPAA business associate agreement and fulfillment of the required breach notification and disclosure provisions. Finally, (H) 'safeguards' are implemented through many of the requirements described above as well as additional screening of data for identifiers. 
DISCUSSION
The investigation and generation of requirements for a DRN such as SCANNER yielded a large number from legal and regulatory sources, as well as the diversity of opinions expressed by stakeholders. Many of the basic network requirements were generated from the initial expert panel legal and regulatory analysis, but others were added from the patient and institutional data analysis. For example, detailed network, institutional and study information (requirements 1.0, 1.1, 1.2) was added from the patient focus group data. Similarly, enforcement of data use by IRB parameters (1.6) and the ability to search for access by user, date time, and other parameters for audit purposes (1.7) were added from institutional interview data. Attestation that consent has been collected or waiver has been granted for PHI (4.1) is an example of a requirement that was generated as a result of combining all three stakeholder perspectives. Regulation requires that consent or a waiver is required for PHI used in research. Patient focus groups highlighted their need to consent for data sharing, and institutional interviewees required that datasharing partners confirm that this was fulfilled.
These results may help DRN developers to construct appropriate governance, users to assess whether DRNs meet their needs, and patients to determine the trustworthiness of DRN operators.
Some requirements can be met by technology, and others can be met by contracts, attestation of users, or management supervision. The SCANNER team is actively pursuing solutions for requirements of deidentified and LDS, acknowledging that some solutions predate the development of SCANNER (eg, establishing accounts, obtaining informed consent). The remaining requirements will be placed in a development roadmap that balances stakeholder priorities, resources, and availability and potential integration of alternative tools and solutions.
There are other important data governance issues that were not addressed in this project. For example, 'anonymization' or obfuscation of data for secondary use is a critical area of investigation. [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] However, most DRNs expect that the data supplier would apply these tools before making the data accessible via the network. It is possible that a network could make research participant identity available depending on permissions. Like most other DRNs, SCANNER's architecture maintains PHI within the data supplier's firewall, and only results of analyses are exchanged through the network, thereby staying within the HIPAA safe harbor limits as recommended by privacy and legal experts. 20 The requirements described here are one example of a process for integrating stakeholder perspectives into the development of data governance mechanisms in DRNs. Many of these requirements apply to other DRNs, but some that operate under different state regulations and have different purposesfor example, networks involving for-profit institutions-may have a different set of policies. This study was limited by the small number of stakeholders involved in the three projects (seven experts, 36 patients, and 15 institutional interviewees). However, we noted convergence among them, supporting the conclusion that the requirements generated are valid. Future studies using the same methodology will help to determine the applicability of our findings to other DRNs.
CONCLUSION
DRNs can protect privacy and fulfill legal/regulatory guidelines through a combination of strategies, including agreements, alerts to users of their obligations and attestations of compliance, and development of network technical capabilities for screening, monitoring, and enforcement. Generation of DRN requirements is often a process run by technical and scientific personnel with limited input from stakeholders. As DRNs seek to become more relevant to clinicians and patients and sustained by their institutions, it is prudent to engage stakeholders in developing systems that meet their needs.
